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The Ethicality of Corporate Political Activity 
 
Responsible Firm Behaviour in Political Markets: Judging the 
Ethicality of Corporate Political Activity in Weak Institutional 
Environments  
 
Abstract 
While support for corporate political activity (CPA) is well echoed in the literature, little has 
been done to empirically examine its ethicality. Moreover, existing ethical CPA frameworks 
assume normative and rational leanings that are insufficient to provide a comprehensive 
account of CPA ethicality. Utilizing the Ghanaian context, adopting a multiple case study 
design involving 28 Directors from 22 firms, and employing a grounded theory approach, I 
explore how the ethicality of CPA is determined in weak institutional environments. The 
findings reveal that business executives evaluate ethics at three levels (i.e. context, 
organizational and strategy) using three principles (i.e. utilitarianism, justice and institutions). 
Leveraging this knowledge, I present an eclectic framework that bridges the long-standing 
gap between normative ethical prescriptions and lived ethical realities. In doing so, I move 
away from abstraction to give “voice” to the actors involved in CPA. I also present a model 
that shows how the ethical judgement process is influenced by managerial intuition and 
interactive personal and organizational experiences. This article has important theoretical and 
practical implications for ethical business-government relations in developing countries.      
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Introduction 
Politicians wield enormous influence in business environments (Weidenbaum, 1980; Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999). Their power to formulate policies and shape institutions has an inevitable 
effect on firm performance (Bonardi et al., 2006; Marsh, 1998). This has led to a surge in 
corporate political activity (hereafter CPA), which refers to corporate efforts to influence 
government policy in favourable ways (Hillman et al., 2004). CPA research has mainly 
focused on topics such as the antecedents of political strategies (Hillman and Wan, 2005; 
Liedong and Frynas, 2017), the nature and types of political activity (Barron, 2011; Decker, 
2011) and the outcomes of political activity (e.g. Hadani and Schuler, 2013). 
Though the current CPA research trajectory has unquestionable merits, it overlooks 
the ethicality of political activity. The interactions between politicians and firms have serious 
ethical implications that should not be ignored. According to Christensen (1997: 88), “there is 
an urgent need for study of the ethics of engaging in corporate political activity.” CPA may 
improve firm performance (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011; Rajwani and Liedong, 
2015), but it may also create an unfair business environment that negatively affects consumer 
welfare and overall socio-economic development (Barker, 2008; Mantere et al., 2009), 
especially in developing countries where it is largely unregulated (Liedong, 2017). Despite 
these potential problems (Lawton et al., 2013), the ethicality of CPA has received little 
research attention (Neron, 2016). A few frameworks for conducting ethical CPA have been 
proposed (e.g. Oberman, 2004; Hamilton and Hoch, 1997; Weber, 1997), but they are 
conceptual, normative and prescriptive. There is therefore a lack of empirical research that 
gives “voice” to managers to understand their ethical experiences. Consequently, we have 
limited knowledge of the actual criteria and conditions that managers consider when judging 
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the ethicality of their political engagements. This curtails our cognizance of the consonance 
or dissonance between conceptual normative ethical prescriptions and lived ethical realities.  
The prevailing normative approach to the ethicality of CPA, which is consistent with 
the dominant trajectory in the broader ethics literature (Rest, 1986; Jones, 1991) and is 
reflected in the prevalence of organizational codes of conduct (Weaver, 2001), is particularly 
problematic because it implicitly assumes that individuals are rational actors who indulge in 
systematic and conscious reasoning to make sound decisions. Such a rationalist perspective 
treats ethical decision making as a reflexive and deliberative process whereby actors can 
logically evaluate their actions based on established cognitive guidelines. However, this is not 
always true. Due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1972), intuition plays a fundamental role in 
ethical judgements (Haidt, 2001) and actually accounts for a wide range of unethical practices 
(De Cremer et al., 2011). This suggests the insufficiency of the rationalist and normative 
perspective for comprehensively understanding how ethical judgements are made 
(Barraquier, 2011).       
Moreover, existing ethical frameworks implicitly assume that CPA occurs in strong 
institutional environments. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, the frameworks are 
dominantly underpinned by the theories of utilitarianism, justice and rights (Bentham, 1789; 
Mill, 1863; Rawls, 1971; Perelman, 1963; Cavanaugh et al., 1981). These theories seem to be 
more relevant in well-functioning, developed and stable contexts. For instance, the rule of 
law is mostly illusive in developing countries. Second, and more importantly, CPA research 
was previously concentrated in Western contexts, which explains the orientation of existing 
ethical frameworks (e.g. Barker, 2008; Grimaldi, 1998; Neron, 2016; Keffer and Hill, 1997). 
However, CPA research has now expanded beyond earlier remits into Asia, Africa and other 
regions characterised by institutional fragility (e.g. Puck et al., 2013; Liedong et al., 2017; 
Nell et al., 2015; White et al., 2015; Wocke and Moodley, 2015; Mbalyohere et al., 2017). In 
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these developing contexts, normative ethical guidelines barely exist in the private sector, so 
how do firms judge ethicality?  
To address the gaps above, this article addresses the overarching question – how do 
managers in institutionally weak environments determine the ethicality of corporate political 
activity? Specifically, it utilizes a behavioural approach to explore the political strategies 
used in Ghana and the interplay of factors that affect managers’ ethical judgements of those 
strategies. A behavioural approach, as opposed to a rationalist perspective, is appropriate for 
understanding how managers make complex decisions amid divergent interacting factors 
(Barraquier, 2011). The choice of Ghana as a suitable research context for exploring CPA 
ethicality is based on various reasons. First, Ghana is recognized as a beacon of democracy, 
hope, peace and stability in the Africa region and is popularly dubbed the “gateway to West 
Africa” (Debrah, 2002; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). Hence, the sanity of her CPA is 
critical to the wider development of ethical business-government relations in the sub-region. 
Second, business-government relations positively affect Ghana’s socio-economic 
development through their impact on public-private partnerships, policy formulation and 
capacity building (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). However, Ghana suffers institutional 
weaknesses (Acquaah, 2007; Liedong et al., 2017), which gives rise to systemic corruption 
(van den Bersselaar and Decker, 2011; Liedong and Frynas, 2017) and poor corporate 
governance practices within politically active firms (Liedong and Rajwani, 2018). These 
problems curtail or negate the promise of CPA and call for ethical business-government 
relations, which can be achieved by firstly understanding how managers evaluate the 
ethicality of their political engagements. Lessons from Ghana, an icon of democracy in 
Africa, can be transferred to other institutionally similar countries within the region.  
This article makes three key contributions. First, it sheds light on the political 
strategies used by firms in weak institutional contexts, and adds to the variety of political 
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tactics already documented in the literature. Extant CPA strategies are mostly western-
oriented (e.g. Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Keim and Zeithaml, 1981) 
and thus have limited applicability in developing countries where the institution frameworks 
do not support their deployment (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Currently, managerial 
political ties are portrayed as the major political strategies used in developing countries (e.g. 
Li et al., 2008; Peng and Luo, 2000; White et al., 2015), but this is half the story. I uncover 
three strategies, namely financial, relational and logistic strategies that are leveraged on and 
facilitated by weak regulatory conditions.  
 Second, I contribute to the business ethics literature by presenting an eclectic 
framework and a process model to capture how managers judge the ethicality of political 
activity in weak institutional environments. Through the framework, I bridge the long-
standing gap between normative prescriptions and actual experiences, perceptions and 
evaluations of CPA ethicality. In doing so, I move away from abstraction, give “voice” to 
CPA actors and extend theory (e.g. Gao, 2008; Oberman, 2004) by adding two new 
dimensions of ethical analysis - namely context and organizational – to the unidimensional 
approach adopted in existing ethical frameworks. The eclectic framework herein holistically 
shows how the ethicality of political activity is judged at three levels - context (where CPA is 
done), organizational (who does CPA), and strategy (how CPA is done), with each level 
entailing an array of pertinent issues and criteria informed by three ethical principles – 
utilitarianism, justice and institutions. Noteworthy is the institutions principle, which is 
arguably inconspicuous in Western-based ethics frameworks (e.g. Keffer and Hill, 1997; 
Oberman, 2004) but nevertheless echoes the institutional failures in developing countries and 
how ethical judgements consider institutional strengthening as an important criterion. This 
principle recognizes how weak institutions allow “privileged” firms to be egoistic without 
repercussions, exploitative without consequences and usurping without constraints. Through 
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the process model, I open the “blackbox” to show how managerial intuition and experiences 
underpin ethical judgements in weak institutional contexts.  
Finally, this article provides empirical evidence from a developing context to 
corroborate the insufficiency of normative or rationalist ethics (Barraquier, 2011; De Cremer 
et al., 2011) and the weaknesses of utilitarian ethics (Gao, 2008). Optimizing satisfactions for 
the greatest number, which is the cardinal tenet of utilitarianism (Audi, 2007; Cavanaugh et 
al., 1981), is prone to subjective interpretations. My findings show that managers find it 
difficult to define “public interests” or weigh the cost and benefits of their actions for the 
“public.” Consequently, they replace “public interests” with “affiliated group interests”, 
regardless of how narrow or parochial the latter may be. My findings also reveal that the 
difficulty of determining “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Post et al., 1999) is 
accentuated by poor institutional conditions that render efficient cost-benefit analyses 
difficult, giving way to intuitive and convenient short-cuts that favour powerful and “loud” 
interests. In this sense, utilitarianism in weak institutional environments seems to dwell more 
on “voice-power” than “cost-benefits”. These findings demonstrate bounded rationality, 
weakness of rationalist ethics and the prevalence of intuition in CPA ethicality.  
In the next section, I review literature on CPA, the arguments for and against CPA, 
and the theoretical frameworks of CPA ethicality. After, I describe the research methods used 
to collect and analyse the data. Subsequently, I present and discuss the findings. I conclude 
with a note on practical implications and an outline of future research directions.         
Corporate Political Activity 
Governments have the mandate and power to enact rules that shape market institutions and 
business environments (North, 1990). Firms are therefore highly dependent on the policies 
and actions of politicians for conducive investment climates (Lester et al., 2008; Hillman et 
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al., 2009). This is particularly true in developing countries where governments direct the 
allocation of critical resources (Peng and Luo, 2000; Guo et al., 2014) and wield significant 
authority and power amid weak checks and balances to arbitrarily formulate or apply 
regulations (Henisz, 2004; Liedong and Frynas, 2017; White et al., 2015). This dependency 
motivates firms to create linkages to politicians or deploy actions and efforts to influence 
government policy in their favour (Getz, 1997; Hillman et al., 2004). The phenomenon of 
corporations attempting to make their preferences reflected in public policy or seeking to 
benefit from “preferential” government treatment is generally referred to as CPA.   
 Research on CPA has touched on various themes, including the rationale, antecedents 
and performance implications of political embeddedness (Lux et al., 2011; Rajwani and 
Liedong, 2015). Among the firm-level antecedents of CPA, firm size appears more 
prominent. Numerous studies show that large firms are more politically active and are also 
more likely to act alone in political markets (e.g. Hillman et al., 2004; Weymouth, 2012; 
Wocke and Moodley, 2015). This is because they have the resources to engage politicians 
and governments (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). The influence of firm size in CPA, coupled with 
evidence that firms are more likely to do CPA in weak institutional environments where 
economic freedom and regulatory quality are low (White et al., 2015; Wan and Hillman, 
2006), raise ethical concerns regarding inclusive policy making and equitable distribution of 
public goods in developing countries. Large firms could hijack and dominate policy 
processes, to the detriment of smaller firms.   
 CPA is executed through political strategies. The most popular of them are the 
financial, information and constituency building strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). These 
strategies respectively correspond with the three goods exchanged in political markets – i.e. 
money, information and votes (Wan and Hillman, 2006; Bonardi et al., 2005). While I 
acknowledge the usefulness of these strategies, I also note that they do not have universal 
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application. For instance, the information strategy is rarely used in developing countries due 
to lack of supporting institutional structures (Liedong and Frynas, 2017).  
Consequently, most CPA studies in developing markets tend to focus on personal or 
social connections between managers and politicians (e.g. Guo et al., 2014; Li and Zhang, 
2007; Li et al., 2008; Peng and Luo, 2000; White et al., 2015). These connections, 
collectively called relational strategies (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015), are leveraged on the 
cultural conditions (i.e. high context and collective) and economic systems (i.e. relationship-
based) prevailing in developing countries. However, the narrow focus on social relationships 
tells a partial story because firms could use other political strategies. For instance, Chinese 
firms are increasingly deploying corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a political tool to 
gain access to the polity (Wang and Qian, 2011; Zhao, 2012), which is possible because these 
firms are able to exploit their contributions to society in a country where the government is 
keen to advance socio-economic development.  
There is a consensus that CPA increases competitive advantage and improves firm 
performance (see Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015 for 
reviews of the literature). Nevertheless, other studies have documented how political activity 
destroys shareholder value (e.g. Bliss and Gul, 2012; Carretta et al., 2012; Hadani and 
Schuler, 2013). The focus on CPA instrumentality has provided concrete facts about the 
benefits and costs of political embeddedness, but the equivocal value of CPA spurs a debate 
about whether firms should even be allowed to influence public policy.    
Corporate Involvement in Politics: Yes or No? 
According to Clawson et al. (1998: 21), CPA is like “a class struggle just as surely as are 
strikes and mass mobilizations”. By this depiction, CPA aims to protect and safeguard 
corporate interests (Leong et al., 2013), but whether this is right or wrong is open to 
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controversial interpretations. On the one hand, the justification of corporate involvement in 
politics is premised on the concept of corporate citizenship (Logsdon, 2004; Matten and 
Crane, 2005; Wood and Logsdon, 2008) which treats firms as citizens that are permitted, if 
not required, to participate in political processes and contribute to social welfare by filling 
regulatory gaps and sponsoring or endorsing “best political candidates” (Alzola, 2013; 
Scherer et al., 2013). Some scholars argue that firms have the right to speak on public issues 
and protect their interests (Ostas, 2007; Lascelles, 2005). The right to lobby or petition the 
government is defined as the right to free speech (Redish, 1982; Allard, 2008). In addition, 
firms may have knowledge that is useful for policy making (Hamilton and Hoch, 1997). By 
sharing this knowledge, they help politicians to understand issues from different perspectives 
and enable them to formulate informed policies that benefit society while reducing any 
unintended consequences (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Lawton et al., 2014; Christensen et al., 
2017). Information sharing is particularly important because “policymakers are often 
imperfectly informed about the consequences of various policy alternatives for the wealth and 
well-being of their constituencies” (Lohmann, 1995: 267). Firms may also need to represent 
their stakeholders in policy processes (Leong et al., 2013), in which case CPA is considered 
to be a socially responsible activity that is not only permissible, but also obligatory (Neron, 
2016). 
On the other hand, the concept of corporate citizenship has been questioned and 
disputed to oppose corporate involvement in policy making. Firms may be described as 
citizens, but in the real sense, they are only “like citizens in the societal roles they play” 
(Moon et al., 2005, p. 431). Unlike individual citizens, firms cannot vote or run for public 
office (Alzola, 2013; Neron and Norman, 2008). Hence, it is deemed undemocratic and 
illegitimate for non-elected managers to act like State institutions or influence public policy 
(Scherer et al., 2013). Allowing firms to influence policy is unfair because corporate citizens 
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(versus individual citizens) have larger budgets to dominate policy processes and impoverish 
the quality of democratic systems (Alzola, 2013; Dworkin, 2000).  
When firms hijack democratic processes, the costs and benefits of public policy are 
unequally distributed (Grimaldi, 1998). This is because firms are often depicted as self-
interested entities (Oberman, 2004) seeking to influence policy in their favour, regardless of 
the consequences for wider society (Gao, 2008). In this sense, their legitimacy to influence 
public policy is questionable (Scherer et al., 2013). Even more damning is the problem of 
unequal economic and political powers. Without economic equality, the preferences of a few 
“deep-pocketers” become representative of the collective will of citizens and the business 
community (Barnett, 2013). Overall, the answer to the question of whether firms should be 
allowed to participate in policy making is not simple or straightforward. The most convenient 
answer is, it depends, but on what?  
What Makes CPA Ethical?  
Considering the arguments for and against firms’ involvement in policy making, does a 
middle ground exist? Surely, the need for CPA has been acknowledged, but the major 
problem is the negative externality it generates. Some scholars have therefore posited ethical 
frameworks that prescribe what would make CPA ethical, fair and beneficial to the majority 
(e.g. Gao, 2008; Oberman, 2004; Keffer and Hill, 1997). Before exploring these frameworks 
(see summary in Table 1), I would like to firstly acknowledge their theoretical foundations.  
Ethical requirements and principles for CPA are based on the theories of utilitarianism 
(Bentham, 1789), rights (Cavanaugh et al., 1981) and justice (Rawls, 1971). Utilitarianism, a 
branch of consequentialism that focuses on outcomes (Morrison et al., 2018), views ethical 
acts as the ones that produce the greatest good for the greatest number (Audi, 2007; Mill, 
1863). The theory of justice requires ethical acts to be fair and impartial. It holds that there 
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should be distributive justice whereby people are treated similarly when they are similar and 
differently, if different, in proportion to their differences (Perelman, 1963). It also holds that 
people should be compensated for harm or wrong done to them (Cavanaugh et al., 1981). In 
developing countries where poverty and inequity is often rife, national policies and corporate 
actions are expected to be utilitarian and fair to create broad-based prosperity for the greatest 
number while indemnifying affected persons for injury and loss (Beddewela and Fairbrass, 
2016; Hennchen, 2015). This expectation might also exist in the ethical analysis of CPA, but 
the key challenge of utilitarianism is the difficulty of measuring cost and benefits (Post et al., 
1999; Gao, 2008). The theory of rights, which views ethical acts as ones that respect 
fundamental rights (Cavanaugh et al., 1981), has a weaker relevance to developing countries 
where the rule of law is weak (Henisz and Zelner, 2010; White et al., 2015). 
Leveraging the above theories, ethical CPA guidelines are centred on at least three 
issues, namely: 1) the goals or intentions of CPA; 2) the means used to achieve the goals of 
CPA; and 3) the consequences of CPA (see Table 1 for a summary). Oberman (2004) applied 
Mitnick’s (1993) “political contestability” to propose that the ethics of political actions 
should be evaluated on three criteria: access, legitimacy and influence/exploitation. He 
argued that CPA is ethical if it does not violate or restrict the contestability of politics. 
Similarly, Gao (2008) and Tian et al. (2008) proposed that CPA that pursues appropriate 
goals (intentions), uses appropriate means and processes, and results in appropriate 
consequences is absolutely ethical. While Weber (1997) echoed similar views, he argues that 
ethical standards for CPA should be focused on providing practical guidelines regarding 
which behaviours should be avoided, even if legal. Hamilton and Hoch (1997) contend that 
while CPA is a “self-interest” activity, it is not necessarily wrong if all sides present their 
cases and decisions are made to maximize benefits while respecting rights and ensuring just 
distribution of costs and benefits. However, they note that CPA becomes unethical if the 
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objective is to benefit at the expense of the general good. Accordingly, they proposed eight 
standards of business lobbying. In 2002, the Woodstock Theological Centre at Georgetown 
University also developed and published seven lobbying principles (Woodstock Principles). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
------------------------------- 
Other frameworks have also outlined specific criteria for ethical CPA. For instance, 
Keffer and Hill (1997) classified lobbying into three categories - good, problem and bad - 
based on communitarianism and legality. They provide itemized tactics for each category. In 
the same vein, Leong et al. (2013) applied utilitarian logics to derive eight recommendations 
for managing the risk of political donations. Further, Bauer (2014) presented a 
multidimensional responsible lobbying model based on three pillars: 1) alignment of CSR 
and lobbing; 2) consideration of stakeholder needs and interests; and 3) alignment of 
objectives and values with society.  
Overall, existing ethical frameworks provide a useful guide for practicing ethical 
CPA.  However, they are mostly theoretical and normative and hence could be detached from 
reality because actual managerial perceptions of CPA ethicality may differ. The major 
problem with the existing normative approach is that it makes an implicit assumption that 
individuals are rational, deliberative and logical in their ethical evaluation (Rest, 1986; Jones, 
1991; Weaver, 2001). In reality, that is not always true. Research has shown how intuition 
and automatic processes shape ethical judgements (Haidt, 2001; Bargh and Chartrand, 1999). 
In weak institutional environments, normative ethics barely exist in the private sector. This 
raises a question about whether intuition drives ethical judgements. Additionally, the existing 
ethical frameworks for CPA are largely western-oriented, and hence could be inapplicable in 
developing contexts. A scrutiny of the most cited normative ethical models (Trevino, 1986; 
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Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Kelley and Elm, 2003) reveals a limited focus on context. Essentially, 
the broader macro institutional environment is overlooked, despite its stronger influence on 
how individuals make decisions and how organizations behave. In this article, I explore how 
ethical judgements are made, the micro and macro issues considered and the process.  The 
next section describes the methodology I used.   
Methods 
Research Context 
This study is set in Ghana, a democratic country in West Africa. While CPA exists in Ghana, 
there is little research on the practice. So far, only a few studies have empirically studied the 
interactions between businesses and politicians in Ghana (Liedong and Rajwani, 2018; 
Liedong and Frynas, 2017; Liedong et al., 2017). These studies focus on managerial political 
ties – i.e. social connections or relationships between managers and the polity (Acquaah, 
2007; 2012). As Ghana is a relationship-based economy, just as China and other Asian 
countries are (Park and Luo, 2001; Xin and Pearce, 1996), personal connections dominate 
CPA. However, firms could be using other political strategies. It costs a minimum of US$ 
85,000 to contest parliamentary elections (CDD Ghana, 2018) in Ghana, hence money plays a 
crucial role in politics, but where does the money come from?  
Ghanaian political parties generate their funds from membership dues, dedicated 
fundraising durbars, bank loans, and nomination fees, but these sources are woefully 
inadequate. Consequently, they are unable to support their candidates, leaving them to rely on 
personal income (CDD Ghana, 2018). This creates opportunities for interests (including 
firms) to capture the political process through “plutocratic funding” (Arthur, 2017; Bagbin 
and Ahenkan, 2017), giving rise to corruption (Liedong, 2017; CDD Ghana, 2018). A former 
14 
 
Minister of State remarked “check all the corruption-related cases…it is linked to campaign 
financing. It is because our hands are tied” (Mordy, 2018). 
Political party financing in Ghana is regulated by the Political Parties Act (2000), but 
the law has loopholes. There are no provisions limiting donations, neither are there 
requirements for disclosing donor identities. Moreover, the law has no limits on how much 
can be spent or how the funds should be used. Consequently, even the Electoral Commission 
(the regulatory body) cannot track how much money political parties raise, from whom, and 
how funds are used (Magolowondo et al., 2012). It is fair to say that except for a ban on 
foreign donations, party financing in Ghana is unregulated. Further, the Electoral 
Commission lacks the capacity to enforce the Political Parties Act, resulting in widespread 
breaches and violations (Arthur, 2017; Ayee et al., 2008).  
Besides weak political financing rules, Ghana lacks formal channels for business-
government relations and policy consultations (Liedong and Frynas, 2017). There are no 
structures specifying the process and requirements for businesses to participate in policy 
making. This, coupled with a generally weak corporate governance culture in the country 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2007; World Bank, 2005), creates not only a breeding environment for 
ethically suspect CPA but also offers an interesting context to explore how managers make 
ethical judgements about CPA. 
Data and Analysis  
I employed a multiple case study design to collect data using in-depth semi-structured 
interviews (Yin, 2003). A qualitative and inductive approach is best suited for this study, as it 
allows for a deeper probing of participants’ rationales, practices and lived experiences (Morse 
and Richards, 2002). As Reinecke et al. (2016: xiv) note, it “offers a more contextual 
understanding of business ethics from the vantage point of the complex and pluralistic reality 
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of the actors themselves…and views business ethics through the lens of the participants’ 
perceptions of his or her experiences rather than through the lens of abstract categories and 
concepts imposed by researchers” I developed the sample in two stages. First, to ensure that 
the sample is representative, I purposely selected 50 small firms, 50 medium firms and 50 
large firms from the membership directory of Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and 
BusinessGhana. These firms were purposely selected because in my previous research, I 
found them to engage in corporate political activity. I verified this status quo before data 
collection. Based on OECD criteria, I defined a small firm as one with 10-49 employees, a 
medium firm as one with 50-249 employees and a large firm as one with 250 or more 
employees. Second, within each of these three strata, I randomly selected 10 firms while 
ensuring industry diversity.  
Calls were made and emails were sent to request participation. After several follow 
ups, 28 Directors and Senior Managers from 22 local firms were interviewed. The final 
sample comprised participants from seven large, eight medium and seven small firms (see 
Sample characteristics in Table 2). Throughout, I preferred respondents whose work or 
positions entrusted in them responsibilities for managing external, public or government 
affairs. Due to the sensitive nature of CPA in Ghana, the respondents were assured of 
anonymity and confidentiality of the data. Consistent with standard practice (Amaeshi et al., 
2016), the pilot-tested questions were sent to the respondents to prepare ahead of the 
interviews. The interviews, which lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour, were recorded and 
transcribed. Following Eisenhardt (1989), I triangulated the interview data with secondary 
data, specifically using news articles to corroborate and validate the primary evidence I 
gathered from managers about the political strategies firms use. 
 
16 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
------------------------------- 
Employing grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and using previously 
validated approaches for inductive theory development (e.g. Yin, 2003), I analysed the data 
in three steps. Following the principles of grounded theory, I started the analysis soon after 
collecting the first bit of data (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The early insights directed the 
subsequent interviews, allowing me to adhere to the standardized interview protocol while 
adjusting for procedural and design flexibility to help discover new concepts (Gioia et al., 
2013).  First, I open-coded and analysed the transcripts (within and cross-case) to develop 
first-order descriptive concepts. In doing this, I was able to construct a story for each of the 
cases. Second, I did axial coding to develop second-order themes by identifying linkages 
between the first-order codes. This process involved iterations between theory and data 
(Gioia et al., 2013) to find informed and grounded connections between the first-order codes 
(Langley, 1999). In the final selective coding stage, I created aggregate dimensions by 
integrating the second-order themes to develop theory of CPA ethicality. This final stage led 
to the development of grand constructs to explain how managers in Ghana make ethical 
judgements (see data structure in Figure 1). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
-------------------------------   
 
Findings 
CPA Strategies 
The data shows that firms in Ghana use three strategies - relational, logistic and financial 
strategies - to wield influence and relevance in the political arena. The relational strategy 
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involves the use of social connections to politicians. These social connections are developed 
in three ways. First, managers who are related to politicians, whether in a nuclear or extended 
family sense, leverage their kinship to gain access to the polity. As Ghana has a collective 
national culture (Ayentimi et al., 2018), kinship is the most valuable asset for deploying a 
relational strategy. Politicians are more willing to extend favours to their own people, and this 
is not only because society expects them to do so, but also because they can trust their own to 
support or protect them in the future. Moreover, much of the rent or favours that politicians 
give to firms do not go through due processes, hence dealing with relatives keeps transactions 
within a small close-knit circle and protects the politician from leakages, betrayals and 
reprisals while guaranteeing economic prosperity for the family. With a common 
understanding that the success of a politician is tantamount to the success of the politician’s 
collective family, politicians trust their relatives to use the opportunity to create a “better 
tomorrow”. In this sense, the effectiveness of kinship is underpinned by politicians’ personal 
gain.  
“When you are a relative to a politician and you own a business, you get special 
privileges no other company may get. You will find yourself at the heart of favourable 
political decisions” (E1)        
The other ways of developing social capital are through school connections, alumni 
associations and friendship. Managers whose former school mates become politicians can use 
their common affiliations to establish political connections. Some managers are also able to 
befriend politicians, although this channel mainly works for the managers of large and visible 
firms. Corporate visibility increases corporate appeal and managerial self-worth (Fuller et al., 
2006), which makes it easier to befriend politicians (Liedong et al., 2017). For the managers 
of small firms, it is easier to befriend politicians before they hold political office. Otherwise, 
it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to reach politicians when they are incumbents.  
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“It is better to know them [politicians] before they win power because when they have 
power, they cater more to those they already know. Newcomers are treated like 
opportunists” (T1) 
The data shows that the relational strategy is widely used in Ghana. CPA research in 
developing countries mainly show that firms try to influence politicians using social capital, 
which they develop through informal personal connections (Peng and Luo, 2000; Li et al., 
2008; Guo et al., 2014) or formal directorships and shareholding (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006). Indeed, previous studies have examined the former 
within the Ghanaian context (Acquaah, 2007; Liedong et al., 2017). The findings herein are 
consistent with these studies.  
The logistics strategy entails firms creating access to politicians by providing material 
and logistical support during campaigns. Due to limited and ineffective sources of financing 
for political parties in Ghana (Bagbin and Ahenkan, 2017; Fobih, 2011), politicians rely on 
personal income to run their campaigns (CDD Ghana, 2018). Some firms invest in these 
campaigns by supplying materials and equipment such as transportation, branded apparel 
(cloths, shirts, hats), and refreshments (water, snacks, meals). The viability of this strategy 
depends, to a large extent, on whether a firm’s line of business is related to the logistics 
politicians need. For instance, a textile company could easily print campaign banners and 
branded clothing for politicians. A hotel could provide free lodging for politicians and their 
team. A fleet company could provide free transportation services for politicians to canvass 
the country. When firms do this, they take the burden off politicians, and position themselves 
for preferential treatment if the politicians win elections. 
“Political parties need to provide refreshments at their rally grounds and politicians 
need to do same at their homes and offices for their visiting supporters. We provide 
bottled water and soft drinks, and the politicians are grateful and remember us in 
future” (M1)   
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Essentially, the logistics strategy directly provides equipment and services that 
politicians would otherwise pay for. The alternative to this strategy is to give money to 
politicians and political parties to procure their own logistics. The financial strategy, as the 
name suggests, involves firms making financial donations and contributions to politicians and 
political parties. Senior managers and board members directly send financial sponsorship to 
parties and candidates, with the expectation of reciprocation in the future. I found that due to 
the lack of transparency in political party financing in Ghana (Bagbin and Ahenkan, 2017), 
firms hedge against risks by donating to the two dominant political parties that have shared 
the spoils of power since 1992 (i.e. NDC and NPP). This way, it would not matter which 
party wins; the firms will still be in good standing. “When you play all the parties or just the 
major ones, you don’t lose (Q1). The financial strategy is similar to political action 
committee (PAC) contributions that are replete in western CPA literature (e.g. Cooper et al., 
2010; Dean et al., 1998; Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Milyo et al., 2000; Schuler et al., 2002), 
but different in the sense that it is largely unregulated and opaque.   
Secondary evidence suggests that the logistics and financial strategies are also 
prevalent in Ghana. For instance, the Ghana Private Transport Union (GPRTU) - an umbrella 
group or trade union of private transport owners in Ghana - provided free transportation for 
NDC (political party) members and supporters to travel to rallies and polling stations during 
the 2004 elections (Arthur, 2017; Fobih, 2008). There is also evidence of businesspersons 
sponsoring political parties in Ghana for favours (Houlton, 2012), a phenomenon labelled 
“pay to play” (Atta Mills, 2018). It underpins the rampant corruption in the country. A former 
Minister of State, whose tenure was marred by corruption scandals, noted that:  
“People who have given you T-shirts and money and all kinds of things and now you 
are dealing with them… there were pressures from within and without because you 
are cutting off the source of funding…check all the corruption-related cases, from 
BOST to whatever, it is linked to campaign financing. There is always a financier 
there”(Mordy, 2018). 
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I note that some of the above strategies have not been documented in the emerging 
market CPA literature. Two reasons might explain why. First, the majority of emerging 
market CPA studies tend to focus on managerial political ties (e.g. Sheng et al., 2011; White 
et al., 2015), but these ties are like end-form strategies that are founded on other intermediate 
strategies. The relational, logistics and financial strategies offer conduits for establishing 
political ties. In this sense, political ties are higher-order strategies propped up by lower-order 
logistics and financial strategies.  
“You cannot just walk up and befriend a politician. Something has to give to get the 
friendship going. Money or material support are sure starting points” (A1)   
Second, the absence of a strong regulatory framework to legitimize and make political 
party financing transparent (Arthur, 2017; Ayee et al., 2008) has caused firms to be highly 
discreet about their financial and logistic support for politicians. Being explicit is unwise, as 
it could lead to political witch-hunt from opposition parties and politicians. This typically 
takes the form of sabotage, discrimination and revocation of public contracts (Arthur, 2017). 
In Brazil where there is a law that regulates campaign financing, researchers have been able 
to examine contribution data (Claessens et al., 2008). Unfortunately, this kind of data does 
not exist in Ghana. Even Ghana’s Electoral Commission (i.e. the regulator) may not have this 
data. Overall, I found strategies that are largely undocumented in the literature, partly because 
Ghana’s institutional conditions make them inconspicuous and partly because they are 
inaccessible to the dominant quantitative approaches utilized in the CPA literature. I also 
found overwhelming evidence that CPA is perceived as unethical. “A lot of the interactions 
between companies and politicians are shady” (F1). Taking cue from this, I further explored 
how managers judge the ethicality of CPA.   
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Ethical Evaluation 
The data revealed that there are three levels at which the ethicality of political activity is 
analysed – context, organizational and strategy. At each level, respondents applied utilitarian, 
justice and institutions principles to make their judgements using established criteria. These 
criteria and the ethical principles are informed and shaped by interactive personal and 
organizational experiences (e.g. CPA performance, CPA outcomes), which subsequently 
develop and strengthen managers’ intuition of CPA.  
Context Level: Here, ethical judgements consider the general environment within 
which CPA is done. I aggregated managers’ views into three perspectives – legal, legitimacy 
and impoverishment. Within the legal perspective, respondents indicated that when there are 
laws governing political strategies, they perceive CPA to be ethical. This perspective equates 
legality with ethicality. If political strategies are unregulated, they are judged to be unethical. 
Because Ghana does not have strong CPA regulatory structures, the respondents argued that 
the relational, logistics and financial strategies are liable to abuse whereby sponsors can usurp 
power and become dictatorial to undermine democratic processes, harm the majority and treat 
others unfairly.  
“If the law does not clearly specify the terms of engagement, then there is an ethical 
problem. Regulation makes things clear and protects everyone” (B2) 
Despite this view, managers feel pressured to do CPA to gain or sustain competitive 
advantage. Though they could voluntarily disengage from the polity, as suggested by Weber 
(1997), doing so will disadvantage them if other firms continue to engage with politicians 
(Grimaldi, 1998). This is similar to the disadvantage that firms face when they are loners in 
the fight against corruption (Liedong, 2017; Luiz and Stewart, 2014), but it more importantly 
shows how rationality does not prevail against norms and bandwagons regardless of the 
logical and cognitive views held by actors.   
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“Regardless of how bad we think it is, we cannot withdraw while our competitors are 
doing politics. Not good for our business. We have no choice but to also do politics” 
(L1)   
In contrast, the legitimacy perspective believes that if the law does not clearly regulate 
or prohibit CPA, then there are no ethical concerns. For this perspective, political strategies 
that are common and widely used are considered legitimate, even if they straddle “gray 
zones” in terms of the law. What matters is the “normality” of the political strategies. 
Normality in this instance refers to the prevalence of the strategies, and the extent to which 
they are accepted in business and political circles. Respondents argued that if other firms are 
doing CPA, there are no ethical problems with their firms also doing it, indicating how 
isomorphic pressures to do CPA may cause managers to absolve themselves of ethical blame. 
The views from the legitimacy perspective are consistent with Christensen’s (1997: 85) 
argument that the legitimacy of CPA “depends on the expectations of society – its political 
culture.” It also corroborates Hilliard’s (2002) assertion that people in Africa justify 
widespread practices to be ethical. Indeed, it can be argued that CPA is part of Ghana’s 
political culture, even if unregulated. “If it is common, it must be acceptable” (P1)  
The third perspective is impoverishment. Poverty affects ethical judgements, in the 
sense that managers determine the morality of their political actions on basis of how they 
create or entrench poverty and marginalize or treat poor people. With limited social welfare 
services in Ghana to reduce abject poverty (Dankyi et al., 2017), the respondents mentioned 
that CPA could derail (at worst) or stifle (at best) government’s efforts, policies and 
institutions to create and equitably distribute social benefits. In this respect, CPA is perceived 
to be unethical.  
“Because we try to connect with politicians in this country where there is high 
poverty, the default thinking is that we are doing something that will benefit ourselves 
and harm the others” (P1) 
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Overall, these findings bring to the fore the impact of a country’s regulatory, 
institutional and socio-economic conditions on ethical judgements of CPA. Though they may 
be consistent with other ethical issues expounded in the literature, some are different to an 
extent. For instance, previous studies have rarely explored beyond the effect of the 
organizational context on ethical issues. The findings herein capture ethical judgements based 
on the national context. Moreover, the impoverishment perspective is new to the literature. 
More importantly, the findings contradict Abratt et al.’s (1992) claim that culture does not 
play a role in managers’ ethical beliefs. Their study of South African and Australian 
managers suggests that context does not matter in ethical analysis. This is contentious, 
considering the prevalence of institutional differences and moral relativism across the world. 
In advanced countries, fraud is widely understood to be unethical. In South Africa, Rossouw 
(2000) found that fraudsters rationalize their actions using the old alibi that “when in Rome, 
do what the Romans do”. Surely, context matters in ethical judgements in Africa (Muthuri 
and Gilbert, 2011).      
Organization Level: At the organizational level, managers’ ethical judgements are 
based on the firms or organizations doing CPA. Here, two criteria are used. The first is firm 
size. When large firms are involved in CPA, the perception is that the practice is unethical. 
Such perceptions are largely held by managers from small firms. The reason for this view is 
explicated on the grounds of fairness, with respondents arguing that large firms are already 
privileged and should not use the policy process for further enrichment to the detriment of 
smaller firms. This view is consistent with previous expositions of power abuse (e.g. Alzola, 
2013; Leong et al., 2013) and pseudo-voice (Barnett, 2013). On the flipside, small firms are 
absolved of ethical responsibility, on the basis that they may not be able to use CPA to 
substantially harm competitors or society.  
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“It’s OK for small companies to try and do politics. In any case, we know they are 
mostly unsuccessful and their impact is less. They can have some of the national cake 
too, but we take exceptions to the large firms. They have too much influence.” (F2) 
While such perceptions are aligned with the unequivocal fact that large firms do more 
CPA (e.g. Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011), they are dangerous because they place small 
firms under the radar, even though they may be highly embedded in politics. They also 
overlook the possibility of politicians and their financiers using newly established (and small) 
companies as vehicles to formally extract rent from the State through fictitious or inflated 
contracts. More importantly, such perceptions, grounded in principles of fairness and 
equality, evince biases that could stifle innovation and entrepreneurship (Gao, 2008). Large 
firms are not created overnight. They grow over time, through a combination of good 
management and competitive strategies. If they cannot reap the benefits of their success, such 
as political access, where is the motivation to grow? Clearly, this has implications for private 
sector development. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that a large proportion of 
unethical practices in corporate Africa involve large firms, demonstrating the need for moral 
capitalism on the continent (Amaeshi and Idemudia, 2015). A large firm manager noted: 
“Our competitors see our political engagements to be exploitative. They do not like 
that we have access to the political structure, but we have worked hard to gain the 
recognition and our impact on the economy is higher. If the politicians do not listen to 
us, it is bad for us and the country” (I1) 
 The second criterion is organization type. Whether an organization is for-profit or 
non-profit influences the ethical perceptions of its CPA. The interviews revealed that 
managers hold a positive view of CPA by non-profit organizations (e.g. NGOs, charities), 
believing that these organizations uphold utilitarian values and work for the betterment of 
society. The opposite applies to profit organizations. By default, the CPA of these firms is 
perceived to be market-distorting, self-interested and unethical.  
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“NGOs stand up for societies and communities. They are not selfish because they do 
not operate for money. We trust their political activity to be in the best interest of the 
country” (V1) 
It is understandable why managers would hold positive evaluations of charities and 
NGOs in Ghana. These organizations have played an important role in the country’s socio-
economic development (Porter, 2003), manifested through their activities to strengthen 
institutions, structurally adjust the economy and reduce poverty (Gary, 1996). However, not 
all NGO activity is ethical or utilitarian. According to Mercer (2002: 12), “NGO impact is 
more complex, serving to strengthen the state and/or society in some contexts, but to weaken 
or undermine them in others.” In Ghana, there have been cases of NGO fraud (Duku-
Boateng, 2018), which should tamper the perceived “saintliness” of NGOs.  
Strategy Level: The final level of analysis is the political strategy. Consistent with 
previous frameworks (Gao, 2008; Tian et al., 2008; Weber, 1997; Grimaldi, 1998), I coded 
three distinct issues that managers consider to make ethical judgements – Purpose (P), 
Mechanism (M), and Outcome (O). Respondents question the purpose (P) of a political 
strategy to determine whether it is un/ethical. Three purposes emerged from the data. First, 
firms do CPA get public contracts or trade opportunities, similar to what happens in the 
Western world (e.g. Schuler et al., 2002; Witko, 2011). Second, they do CPA for political 
support to overcome institutional weaknesses such as bureaucracy. Both purposes are self-
interested, and are perceived to be unethical because they may disadvantage other firms. 
Nevertheless, they reflect the immense power politicians in developing countries wield to 
allocate resources and direct public machinery (Gao et al., 2017; Liedong and Frynas, 2017; 
Peng and Luo, 2000). The third purpose is to protect industry interests, which is perceived to 
be ethical, even if industry interests are not in consonance with public interests.  
“It is difficult to know what the public wants, because people have different positions. 
It becomes more convenient for us to think about what our associations and industry 
want, rather than what the public wants.” (D1) 
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Managers noted the vagueness of public interests, indicating that there are always 
different views and positions on various issues, which makes it difficult to determine what 
the “public” is. “I cannot tell what the collective preference is, because different people want 
different things” (R1). In such situations, they consider their immediate group affiliations. 
This may explain why some communities in Africa overlook national interests to protect their 
members who are implicated in corruption. The cases of President Jacob Zuma of South 
Africa and Senator James Ibori of Nigeria’s Delta State are examples where wrongdoing was 
defended by affiliated groups. Essentially, the “public” has a lesser meaning, and so do 
“public interests”.      
Managers also examine the ethicality of the mechanisms (M) through which the 
political strategies achieve the purposes of CPA. I coded two mechanisms from the data – 
political access and political capture. The political access mechanism exists when political 
strategies create opportunities for firms to reach politicians, be involved in political decisions 
or gain access to critical resources. Political access has been widely documented as an 
intermediate outcome or rationale of CPA (e.g. Ansolabehere et al., 2002; Liedong et al., 
2015; Brown, 2016; Mellahi et al., 2016). However, the political access mechanism herein 
has a much deeper connotation – it should not preclude or intentionally block others. In this 
sense, political access is ethical when firms focus on what they can get for themselves 
without stifling others. A fair playing field, similar to Oberman’s (2004) political 
contestability argument, is central to this mechanism.  
The opposite of political access is political capture, which refers to the process 
whereby firms use their CPA to prevent competitors or other stakeholders from gaining 
access to politicians or political systems. Firms that provide finance or logistics to political 
parties could wield power and control elected officials in ways that exclude others and 
destroy the quality and effectiveness of democratic institutions. Consistent with Abratt and 
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Penman’s (2002) findings in South Africa, I found that actions involving financial 
consideration or exchange are perceived to be unethical because they are exclusive. The 
political capture mechanism resembles firms using CPA to raise rivals’ cost of doing business 
or control their competitors’ access to resources in factor markets (e.g. Capron and Chatain, 
2008; McWilliams et al., 2002). 
“If you try to use your political engagements to get what you can get, your share of 
the national cake on the blind side of competitors, that’s fine. When you stifle 
competitors, it’s bad” (U1) 
The final criterion for analysing the ethicality of political strategies is the outcome (O) 
of CPA. Does the cost exceed the benefit? Does CPA cause harm to others? Does it weaken 
national institutions? These questions underpin managers’ judgements. CPA that generates 
more benefits than costs for firms, affiliated groups and the public (though difficult to 
determine), and does not undermine State institutions is perceived to be ethical. “For political 
engagements to be ethical, they must favour and support more people and systems than they 
destroy” (N1). This view reflects recent evidence of how business-government interactions 
cause corporate social irresponsibility, create dismal conditions and harm stakeholders in 
South Africa and Ghana (Hamann et al., 2019; Liedong and Rajwani, 2018).    
Based on the findings, I created an eclectic framework (Table 3) that reflects how 
managers make ethical judgements at the three levels (context, organization and strategy) 
using three ethical principles (utilitarianism, justice and institutions). This framework, which 
contains the key questions asked during ethical evaluations, differs from previous works (e.g. 
Gao, 2008; Oberman, 2004; Tian et al., 2008) in two ways. First, it provides finer-grade 
multi-level criteria that is built on the “voice” and experience of ethical actors. Second, it 
considers the nuances and peculiar circumstances of CPA in weak institutional environments. 
As such, this framework has applicability in both developed and developing contexts. 
Leveraging the eclectic framework and respondents’ first-hand accounts, I also create a 
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model to show the process of ethical judgement. Personal experience (and intuition) and 
organizational experience interact to influence the ethical criteria managers use and the 
ethical principles they apply to make ethical judgements. These ethical judgements 
subsequently influence firms’ CPA (i.e. the intensity and the strategies used).       
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 & Figure 2 
-------------------------------   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this article, I examined how managers evaluate the ethicality of CPA in weak institutional 
environments. The findings reveal that ethical judgements are made through an iterative 
discernment process using three ethical principles (i.e. utilitarianism, justice and institutions) 
at three levels (i.e. context, organizational and strategy). Consistent with the evidence, it is 
plausible to argue that CPA done in an appropriate context, by appropriate organizations and 
through appropriate channels is ethical. Appropriate, in this instance, refers to CPA that 
benefits the majority, treats other interest groups and firms equally and fairly, and supports or 
promotes institutional strengthening. The levels of ethical analysis reported in this article 
correspond with three crucial themes that have emerged from the data: 1) where CPA is done; 
2) who does CPA; and 3) how CPA is done. These themes embody various criteria and 
principles that make significant contributions to the CPA and ethics literature. Before going 
into the contributions, I highlight a few pertinent issues that call to question the rationalist 
approach to CPA ethicality.  
 First, there is a strong view that the lack of CPA regulation makes corporate political 
engagements unethical. This view equates legality and ethicality, which of course is not 
appropriate as ethics should rise above law’s minimum standards (Katz et al., 2017; Weber, 
1997), but it raises an interesting question - does the lack of specific CPA regulation make 
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CPA unethical? According to Keffer and Hill (1997: 1376), “those actions that are legal and 
do not inflict undue harm on members of the community are categorized as good. Those 
activities that fall under the bad classification are considered illegal and have the potential to 
seriously injure parties outside of the lobbying process” Effectively, Keffer and Hill argue 
that legal lobbying is ethical lobbying, but is legality a good measure of ethicality? If yes, we 
would expect few or no ethical problems in countries such as US where CPA regulations 
exist. However, reality paints a different picture. Most ethical CPA frameworks and much of 
the critique in the literature are developed in response to lobbying in the US (e.g. Hamilton 
and Hoch, 1997; Keffer and Hill, 1997; Weber, 1997; Neron, 2016). In the emerging world, 
Brazil has campaign contribution laws but those laws could not prevent the political party 
financing scandals that were uncovered in the Operation Car Wash investigations.   
The foregoing suggests that laws may not prevent unethical practices. Nevertheless, 
some managers in developing countries perceive legality as a measure of ethicality. Research 
in African countries show a strong focus on compliance-based ethics (e.g. Chilima, 2019; 
Eweje, 2009; Muthuri and Gilbert, 2011; Nakpodia et al., 2018; Nwabuzor, 2005; Price and 
Walt, 2013), which demonstrates the importance of legislation in corporate governance and 
ethical judgements. Keffer and Hill’s (1997) legal-ethics assertion resonates this reality in 
weak institutional contexts where CPA laws are non-existent. CPA regulations delineate 
boundaries of conduct, assign responsibilities and provide mechanisms for addressing 
political market failures. Without them, there are no standards for identifying wrongful 
behaviour and no basis to seek redress. In Ghana, the Political Parties Act (2000) has several 
loopholes (Arthur, 2017), to an extent Fobih (2008) argues that party financing is unregulated 
except for a provision restricting foreign donations. Ghana also lacks a strong structure for 
lobbying or petitioning policy issues. The culmination of these institutional weaknesses is a 
non-transparent CPA environment that is prone to capture and clandestine dealings. In sum, 
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laws provide a strong foundation for ethics but laws are not necessarily ethical. Moreover, 
even in the absence of CPA laws, all the respondents (including those holding the legality 
view) do CPA, which suggests the lack of rationality in CPA in weak institutional 
environments.  
Second, the perceived “saintliness” of charities’ and NGOs’ CPA requires scrutiny. 
Business and management researchers have not paid adequate attention to these 
organizations, as far as the ethicality of their CPA is concerned. NGO lobbying has been 
widely documented in the political and health sciences literature (e.g. Lencucha et al., 2011; 
Junk, 2016; Warleigh, 2000), but the morality of their political activity continues to fly under 
the radar, especially in developing countries where they are involved in public governance 
and social welfare provision.  On the one hand, NGOs serve as the bridge between society 
and governments, representing the interests of communities in policy making. In Ghana, they 
have contributed to poverty reduction (Porter, 2003) and the passing of various legislations 
(e.g. the Right to Information Law). In Tanzania, they have been involved in strengthening 
environmental and land policies (Elliott-Teague, 2008). In Kenya, they have drawn attention 
to supply chain issues and labour rights and helped to institutionalize CSR (Muthuri and 
Gilbert, 2011). These activities paint a good picture of the work and role of NGOs in 
developing countries, but is this enough for a one-sided view that generalizes all NGO 
lobbying as ethical? 
There is a dark side to NGO activity. Development has become big business with 
attractive financial benefits. In Ghana, and perhaps in other developing countries, there has 
been a proliferation of local NGOs over the past few decades. Not all of them are established 
to serve public interests. Some are vehicles for wealth accumulation, done through the 
embezzlement of grants. Others are vehicles for defrauding less privileged people (Duku-
Boateng, 2018). Even local politicians in Ghana create their own NGOs and use them as 
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patronage structures and political vehicles for self and party promotion (Mohan, 2002). These 
local NGO problems do not necessarily boost the saintliness of International NGOs whose 
operations also raise ethical concerns. There is a question of whether international NGOs are 
really committed to the development of poor countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
executives of these organizations overlook, ignore or cover up misappropriation of 
developmental assistance due to fears that donors may cut back funding, which may cause 
them to lose their jobs (and the pecks). Hence, there is potential complicity of international 
NGOs in the widespread corruption recorded in developing countries.   
Moreover, international NGOs may promote the interests or advance the agendas of 
their foreign donors or even act as their home governments’ foreign policy vessels. This may 
not be in the best interest of developing countries. While they often collaborate with local 
NGOs to gain knowledge or legitimacy, the partnerships are not equal because they and their 
funders determine the policy agendas to a larger degree (Mohan, 2002). In this sense for 
instance, the activities of USAID and DFID may support US and UK interests, but not those 
of the local people. Furthermore, there is the issue of power relations between international 
NGOs and governments in developing countries. These NGOs have the capacity to influence 
global politics and the policies of organizations on which developing countries are largely 
dependent, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and United Nations 
(Tallberg et al., 2018). They may also receive strong backing from powerful home 
governments, dwarfing the ability of poor countries to withstand their political pressures. In 
sum, not all NGOs are saints and not all their CPA is ethical. However, due to bounded 
rationality and intuition, managers think otherwise.      
Shifting to the significance of this article, I would like to first acknowledge that some 
studies have posited theoretical frameworks for examining the ethicality of CPA (e.g. Gao, 
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2008; Weber, 1997; Hamilton and Hoch, 1997; Oberman, 2004; Tian et al., 2008). However, 
these studies focus on the ethical requirements of political strategies. Therefore, they address 
only the third level of ethical analysis that I have presented in this article. What I add to these 
frameworks are 1) the contextual level to account for the impact of institutions and 2) the 
organizational level to capture the impact of firm characteristics in the ethical analysis of 
CPA. By adding these two new levels, I extend theory beyond extant criteria for judging the 
ethics of political activity. The findings seem to suggest that, just as firm and institutional-
level factors influence political strategy formulation and mode of political engagement 
(Hillman and Keim, 1995; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Barron, 2011), so do they influence 
ethical judgements.  
While some of the issues and ethical principles reported in this article consistently 
validate and lend credence to extant theoretical criteria, others mark a distant extension. 
Noteworthy is the institutions principle that has emerged as a lens for evaluating ethicality. 
Extant frameworks draw heavily on utilitarian, justice and rights theories of ethics (Bentham, 
1789; Cavanaugh et al., 1981; Rawls, 1971). Surprisingly, the latter was not recognized by 
the respondents, arguably because of a poor understanding of, and weak enforcement of the 
rule of law in Ghana. Instead, it was replaced by an institutions perspective bordering on 
institutional strengthening - a broader lens encapsulating rights, freedoms, structures and 
systems. This institutions perspective is arguably inconspicuous in Western-based ethics 
frameworks (e.g. Keffer and Hill, 1997; Oberman, 2004) but it echoes institutional failures in 
developing countries and how ethical judgements consider institutional strengthening as an 
important criterion.  
I also present evidence that corroborate the weaknesses of the utilitarian and justice 
theories of ethics (see Gao, 2008; Post et al., 1999). It is difficult for managers to determine 
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“public interest” or measure the cost and benefits of their actions, which causes them to resort 
to intuitively using their impact on affiliated groups as the utilitarian yardstick regardless of 
the groups’ representativeness. In this respect, utilitarian “consequentialism” (Mill, 1863; 
Audi, 2007) is narrowly interpreted in weak institutional environments. Due to weak and 
non-existent institutional structures, policy makers also struggle to determine the greatest 
good for the greatest number, causing them to intuitively and conveniently lean towards 
powerful interests with the loudest voice. This article shows that utilitarianism in weak 
institutional environments is based on “power-voice”, not “cost-benefits.” Consequently, 
small firms perceive the political engagements of large (i.e. powerful) firms to be unethical. 
This view reflects a sense of equal entitlement that casts negative light on firms using their 
competitive advantage and success as a basis for seeking differential or preferential treatment 
from the polity. Such views could de-motivate entrepreneurship and innovation (see Gao, 
2008).     
Overall, the ethical framework I present in this article bridges the gap between 
theoretical frameworks and empirics to show how the ethicality of CPA is actually perceived 
and judged. Doing this, I move away from abstraction to reality, helping to open the “black 
box” to understand how managers make ethical judgements of CPA. I show that the 
determination of ethicality is a process underpinned by personal experiences and intuition, 
making it a subjective rather than a rational exercise. However, regardless of this subjectivity, 
the findings show that CPA is mostly perceived to be unethical in weak institutional 
environments. As such, this article helps to reveal how the dark side of CPA might manifest, 
and therefore contributes to the bourgeoning literature on the negative socio-economic and 
governance implications of CPA (e.g. Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Liedong and Rajwani, 2018; 
Mantere et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2016).  
34 
 
 The dark side of CPA is particularly manifested through the strategies firms deploy. 
In Ghana, I found that political strategies are leveraged on absent and weak institutional 
conditions, but more importantly I observe that these strategies are means for developing 
managerial political ties – the dominant strategies in emerging market CPA literature 
(Rajwani and Liedong, 2015).  In this sense, the financial, logistics and relational strategies 
are mere lower-order strategies that are used to develop and orchestrate higher-order 
strategies such as political ties. Based on this new learning, this article contributes to 
unpacking the mechanisms underlying managerial political ties.   
Practice Implications 
Besides theoretical contributions, this article has practical relevance. It provides lessons to 
help managers orchestrate ethical CPA. Firms must not only think about the ethicality of their 
political strategies, but must also consider the environment and the structure of the society 
where they operate. Recognition of institutional conditions will enable managers to develop 
CPA strategies while taking into consideration the likely perceptions and reactions of 
different stakeholders. The questions contained in the framework herein provide good 
guidance in that regard.  
 To address the difficulties of estimating the cost and benefits of their CPA, firms may 
consider creating or strengthening their public and government affairs departments or 
functions. Public affairs functions do not only provide a channel for firms to demonstrate 
transparency or a window for the public to see what goes in firms, but they are also vessels 
for collecting information and gauging public opinion (Griffin and Dunn, 2004). In Ghana, 
research shows that they are useful for engaging stakeholders and legitimizing CSR (Liedong 
et al., 2017). They could thus be useful for engaging the public and conducting systematic 
assessments of policy issues, which will help to ensure that CPA is done in accordance with 
utilitarian principles. In addition, firms could re-structure their top management teams to 
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place a stronger emphasis on external engagements. Board committees for public and 
government affairs could be used to achieve this. Alternatively, as recommended by Doh et al 
(2014), firms could use a dual-CEO management structure whereby they have Chief 
Executive Officers (CEO) responsible for market strategizing and Chief External Officers 
(CEO) for nonmarket strategizing. The latter could ensure proper evaluation of policy 
outcomes for the wider public.     
Taking cue from the findings, governments in developing countries need to enact laws 
to regulate CPA. While these laws may exist, they either have loopholes or are poorly 
enforced, as in the case of Ghana (Arthur, 2017; Ayee et al., 2008; Fobih, 2011). Regulating 
CPA would make it possible to hold firms accountable for illegal and unethical political 
behaviour. It would also ensure transparency and reduce the incidence of bribery and 
corruption. Development agencies and NGOs should thus pay attention to CPA regulation, 
particular party financing, as this is a big source of the corruption and related developmental 
problems recorded in developing countries (Liedong, 2017). In Ghana, this is very true (see 
Houlton, 2012). 
Limitations and Future Research 
Despite this article making important theoretical and practical contributions, it has some 
limitations, which create avenues for future research. First, as seen in many qualitative 
studies, a small sample size limits generalizability. Future studies could therefore try to 
validate my ethical framework in other institutional contexts. Particularly, it would be 
insightful to investigate whether the institutions principle resonates in other developing 
countries.  
Second, existing frameworks for ethical lobbying and the treatise of ethics in the 
business and management literature predominantly focus on the political activities of 
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corporations (e.g. Gao, 2008; Tian et al., 2008; Neron, 2016) while relegating those of 
charities and NGOs to the background, suggesting an implicit assumption that the third 
sector’s CPA is all ethical. As I have already specified elsewhere in this article, such 
assumptions are problematic. Future research should investigate, and preferably develop a 
lobbying framework for NGOs. They play an important role in public and global governance, 
and their activities have ethical implications.  
Third, though a quantitative component could be added to this article to statistically 
tested the findings (i.e. mixed methods), such a component would require one or more 
separate in-depth studies to effectively address the scale of the opportunity. Accordingly, I 
suggest the following directions. Based on the framework herein, future research could 
quantitatively examine how personal and firm-level factors affect managers’ perceptions of 
CPA ethicality. In doing this, survey and secondary data could be used to investigate the 
antecedents of the ethicality of different political strategies. Also, following previous works 
(e.g. Abratt et al., 1992; Abratt and Penman, 2002), future research could use cross-national 
samples to statistically measure and compare the criteria for ethical judgement. This will 
increase understanding of how institutional and cultural variations affect ethical evaluation. 
Along this line, the scope could be extended to different interest groups (e.g. politicians, civil 
society), with specific focus on comparing convergences and divergences in how various 
stakeholders evaluate the ethicality of political engagements.    
Further, the findings in this article may have implications for the CPA-firm 
performance relationship. There is a plethora of research about the impact of political 
strategies on performance (e.g. Bliss and Gul, 2012; Peng and Luo, 2000; Guo et al., 2014), 
but there is limited knowledge of the mechanisms of this impact (Lux et al., 2011; Liedong 
and Rajwani, 2018). Studies have shown how consumers respond to unethical corporate 
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behaviours by adjusting their purchase behaviours (Miller and Sturdivant, 1977; Deng, 2012).  
Could ethicality mediate the value of CPA? This is an interesting research question worth 
answering in future quantitative research.  
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• Using kinship/family ties to politicians 
• Using school/alumni associations 
• Using friendships with politicians 
• Monetary donations to politicians 
• Monetary donations to political parties 
• Supplying material and equipment to politicians/parties for free 
• Providing services to politicians/parties for free 
• Regulation of CPA in the country 
• Legitimacy of CPA in the country 
• CPA and impoverishment in the country 
• The size of the firm that is doing CPA 
• The type of firm that is doing CPA 
•  
Purpose of CPA 
• Win business/contracts 
• Overcome institutional weaknesses/problems 
• Protect industry interests 
Mechanisms of CPA 
• Gaining access to politicians and political processes (access) 
• Using politicians to restrict/disadvantage competitors (capture) 
Outcomes of CPA 
• Impact on affiliated groups 
• Impact on national/public institutions 
Relational 
Financial 
Logistics  
Context 
Organizational  
Strategy 
Political Strategies 
Levels of Ethical 
Evaluation 
Open Coding: 
First-Order Codes -Concepts 
Axial Coding 
Second-Order Codes - Categories 
Selective Coding: 
Aggregated Dimensions 
• National/public institutional strengthening 
• Quality of democratic institutions and processes 
• Policy quality 
• Beneficial or useful to the majority 
• Beneficial or useful to the poor masses 
•  
• Equal access for other interest groups 
• Fair treatment of other interest groups 
Utilitarianism 
Justice 
Institutions 
Principles of 
Ethical Evaluation 
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Figure 1. Data Structure 
Table 2: Sample Characteristics 
Firm Firm Size* Industry Interviewee Interviewee Position 
A Large Mining A1 Manager, External Relations 
B Large Oil & Gas B1 Manager, Business Analysis 
   B2 General Manager, Government Affairs  
C Medium Pharmaceutical C1 Marketing Manager 
D Medium Automobile DI Director, Public Relations 
E Large Oil & Gas E1 
Senior Manager, Policy, Regulatory & Public 
Affairs 
F Small Textiles F1 Chief Financial Officer 
   F2 Manager, Public Affairs 
G Medium Transport GI Managing Director 
H Small Food & Beverage HI Manager, Operations & Communications 
I Large Telecommunications I1 Manager, Regulatory & External Affairs  
J Small Transport J1 Chief Executive Officer 
K Medium Construction KI Deputy Managing Director 
L Large Telecommunications L1 Manager, Corporate Communications 
   L2 Operations Manager 
M Medium Food & Beverage M1 Chief Executive Officer 
N Small Publishing & Stationery N1 Deputy Managing Director 
   N2 General Manager 
O Medium Hotels & Hospitality O1 Chief Executive Officer 
P Large Construction P1 Managing Director 
   P2 Operations Manager 
Q Large Media  Q1 Senior Manager, Corporate Affairs 
R Medium Waste Management R1 Deputy Managing Director 
S Small Construction S1 Director of Operations  
T Small Publishing & Stationery T1 Managing Director 
U Small Media U1 Director of Public Relations 
   U2 Business Operations Manager 
V Medium Manufacturing, Plastics V1 Managing Director 
*Based on OECD criteria, I defined a small firm as one with 10-49 employees, a medium firm as one with 50-249 
employees and a large firm as one with 250 or more employees.
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Table 1. Synthesis of Ethical CPA Criteria a 
 Consequences for representation Rights of other interest groups Justice for other interest groups 
 
Intention/Goal of political 
action 
 
Does intention aim to reduce representation or 
exclude participation of other interest groups in 
political processes? 
 
Does political action attempt to deny rights of 
participation to other interest groups? 
 
Does intention aim to violate shared democratic 
values? 
 
 
Does political action attempt to infringe upon the 
interests of other interest groups?   
Means of political action Does political action reduce rationality of 
political decision-making? 
 
Does action attempt to deceive or manipulate 
other interest groups? 
 
Does political action disclose enough information 
for insiders and outsiders? 
 
 
Does political action contribute to perennial exclusion 
of other interest groups? 
 
Is political action consistent with justice procedure? 
 
If political action harms other interest groups, is there 
corresponding compensation? 
 
  
Consequence/End of 
political action 
Does political action increase entry barriers for 
other interest groups? 
Does political action ignore the rights of other 
interest groups? 
Does political action contribute to perennially unfair 
policy? 
 
Does political action contribute to unfair distribution of 
benefits and burdens? 
 
a  This is a synthesis of ethical frameworks contained in extant literature. It is built on the works of Gao (2008), Oberman (2004) and Tian et al. (2008) and with insights from Weber (1997), Hamilton & 
Hoch (1997) and Leong et al. (2013) 
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Table 3: Framework for Ethical Corporate Political Activitya 
Levels/Principles  Principle of Utilitarianism Principle of Justice Principle of Institutions 
 
Context 
 
Yes = Ethical; No = Ethical Concern 
 
Yes = Ethical; No = Ethical Concern 
 
Yes = Ethical; No = Ethical Concern 
 
• Legality 
 
Is CPA regulated by law to benefit the 
majority? 
 
Is CPA regulated by law to ensure equal access 
to the polity? 
 
Do CPA regulations prevent or reduce harm 
done to other parties? 
 
Do CPA regulations have provisions to 
compensate affected or harmed parties? 
 
 
Is CPA regulation effectively enforced? 
 
Is CPA regulation regularly updated to address 
weaknesses and account for new developments?  
• Legitimacy Is CPA accepted to be in the best interest of 
the majority? 
 
Is CPA expected and normal within the 
political culture? 
 
Does CPA create or support a culture of 
equality? 
 
Is CPA practiced based on fairness?  
 
 
Does CPA strengthen State institutions? 
 
Does CPA reduce existing institutional weaknesses?  
• Impoverishment Does CPA help to reduce poverty among the 
masses? 
 
Is CPA fair to poor people, communities and 
societies?  
 
Does CPA allow the poor to have a “voice”? 
    
Does CPA advocate, promote or support policies and 
initiatives that will ensure broad-based prosperity?  
 
 
Organization Yes = Ethical concern; No = Ethical Yes = Ethical concern; No = Ethical Yes = Ethical concern; No = Ethical 
 
• Size 
 
Do large firms act in ways that harm the 
majority? 
 
 
Do large firms reduce the representation or 
participation of other parties in CPA 
 
Do large firms exploit institutional weaknesses in their 
CPA? 
• Type Is CPA done by profit-seeking organizations 
(serving their self-interests)? 
 
Is CPA done by charities or non-governmental 
organizations serving donor interests? 
 
Is CPA done by profit-seeking organizations 
(seeking to silence opposing voices)? 
 
Is CPA done by profit-seeking organizations (placing 
their interests over institutional quality)? 
 
 
Strategy Yes = Ethical concern; No = Ethical Yes = Ethical concern; No = Ethical Yes = Ethical concern; No = Ethical 
 
• Purpose 
 
Is CPA done to influence issues in ways that 
favour a firm but harm the majority? 
 
 
Is CPA done because the concerns of other 
interest groups can be easily overridden?  
 
Is CPA done because there is institutional weakness to 
exploit? 
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Is CPA done to maintain a status-quo of intuitional 
weakness that allows easy rent extraction and 
cronyism?  
 
• Mechanism Is CPA done by marginalizing the majority? 
 
Is CPA done in a “winner takes all” manner? 
 
Are the gains of CPA achieved through zero-
sum means? 
  
 
Does CPA prevent other interest groups from 
gaining access to politicians? 
 
Does CPA exclude other parties from 
democratic processes? 
 
Does CPA discourage due process? 
 
Do politicians become captives or puppets of the firms 
doing CPA? 
 
Does CPA undermine democratic institutions and 
processes? 
 
 
 
• Outcomes Does CPA harm the majority? 
 
Does CPA create or increase injury or harm 
done to minority groups? 
Does CPA ignore harmed or injured groups? 
 
Are CPA outcomes unfair to other interest 
groups? 
 
Does CPA weaken State institutions? 
 
Does CPA increase poverty? 
 
a This framework contains questions that are asked during the ethical evaluation of CPA. “Yes” answers indicate ethical CPA while “No” answers raise ethical concerns.  
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Figure 2. Process Model of Ethical Judgement 
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